Military版 - Devin Stewart: Is China Taking the Right Cues From History? |
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发帖数: 10589 | 1 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/devin-stewart/is-china-taking-the
Now that China's leadership transition has been completed, its new president
Xi Jinping faces numerous challenges, from
maintaining economic growth to combating corruption, pollution, and food
supply scandals. Yet disagreement has been stirring
on the best path to achieve these goals: whether Xi should relax political
control over society to match economic reforms that
began with Deng Xiaoping in 1978.
Signs suggest Xi's inclination will be to double down on Communist orthodoxy
, based on his reading of the history of the Soviet
Union and its 1991 collapse. In other words, Xi won't be a Mikhail Gorbachev
. He's no reformer.
"Why did the Soviet Communist Party Collapse?" Xi is reported to have asked
during a recent private meeting. "An important
reason was their ideals and convictions wavered. Finally, all it took was
one quiet word from Gorbachev to declare the
dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party, and a great party was gone," Xi
said.
Ironically, Xi concludes that Western "universal" (read "liberal") values
are merely a distraction from the righteous path of
"socialism with Chinese characteristics" and its goal of reaching a
collective "Chinese dream." Xi recommends his party keep a
tight rein on its country's military as well.
Is the Chinese leadership misreading history?
First of all, Xi's account of the facts is open to debate. Another
interpretation of history is that the Soviet Communist Party fell
not because it wavered in its convictions but just the opposite--because it
opposed Gorbachev's reforms. According to a
speech given by former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock, "
Gorbachev understood when he began to try to
reform the Soviet Union that the party apparat was beginning to oppose it.
Therefore, he had to take them out of power in order
to move the country where he wanted it to be. He placed the interests of the
country above the interests of the party, the first
party secretary to do so."
The collapse of the Soviet Union, according to Matlock, instead came from
the KGB's attempted coup and Boris Yeltsin's
refusal to compromise with Gorbachev.
Second, Xi may be drawing the wrong conclusions. To be sure, no analogy is
perfect, but if Xi wants to learn from history, are
the dilemmas that China faces today more like those the USSR faced during
the 1980s when it was stagnating economically or
the 1960s when it was still growing?
Xi's interpretation is that if the Chinese Communist Party wants to avoid
collapse, it should take Gorbachev's reform
(perestroika) of the 1980s as a cautionary tale. In this view, Xi should
avoid the Soviet "mistake" of relaxing its Communist
principles and loosening authoritarian rule. That may be a tactically and
politically shrewd way of assessing risk, especially if
the Chinese government anticipates future popular unrest from an economic "
doomsday" scenario such as the collapse of an
impending real estate bubble.
Another reading is possible: The problem was not that the USSR sought reform
but that it didn't do it before it started to
stagnate economically. The model for China, therefore, may not be tiny,
authoritarian Singapore, as some have suggested, but
rather South Korea, which democratized in the 1980s after it enjoyed rapid
export-led economic growth under a military
dictatorship.
China's short-term strategy of maintaining political stability is
understandable from the perspective of individual leaders like Xi.
But leadership requires difficult choices. Focusing on short-term stability
may ultimately be self-defeating, as I argued when
Google decided to exit China. Can China innovate when the country is the "
world's most active and enthusiastic filterer of
information," as Google chairman Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen write in their
forthcoming book The New Digital Age? I have
heard these concerns about China uttered throughout Asia.
One way of viewing China's dilemma is that in order to become a more
innovative, world-leading economy, it must open up
politically. But doing so would likely invite instability--as Ian Bremmer
described in his 2006 book The J Curve. A leader, like Xi,
who may be interested in his own political survival would understandably
choose stability today over economic dynamism in the
future.
Yet, some of the biggest problems China faces will be confounded by its
closed system--fighting corruption, spurring innovation
and entrepreneurship, and ensuring labor and environmental protections.
Visit China today, and you will likely hear numerous
complaints of corruption. Xi is clearly aware of the public's frustration
around the issue. He said the government will crack down
on corrupt officials and promote a more modest lifestyle for Party members,
many of whom are billionaires. But without a free
and open press and access to information, this effort may be hollow, and
graft will plague economic progress.
The same goes for the promotion of better labor and environmental standards.
It's unclear whether a country can truly tackle
these important issues without a robust and free civil society. Moreover,
without an open society and a free flow of ideas in its
education system, can China transition to an innovation economy? Its
authoritarian rule may ultimately may push out its best
minds and companies, dampening innovation and leading the country to fall
into a "middle income trap." Finally, a rigid political
system may fail to produce leaders who are capable of meeting the challenges.
To assume Chinese people must be ruled with a tight grip is to ignore the
prosperity achieved by free Chinese in Taiwan and
democratic societies worldwide. China remains relatively poor and corrupt.
As the Chinese leadership goes about building long
-term economic growth and a cleaner society, it must consider the trade-offs
between maintaining stability today and
unleashing creativity tomorrow.
Follow Devin Stewart on Twitter: www.twitter.com/devintstewart
北京新领导解读苏共崩溃 是否在误读历史
【记者李婉君编译报道】《赫芬顿邮报》（The Huffington Post）3月19日（周二）刊
登了Devin Stewart的评论文章：中国在正确解读历史吗（Is China Taking the Right
Cues From History?）。以下为译文：
现在，中国的领导层过渡已经完成，新的国家主席习近平面临诸多挑战：从保持经济增
长，到打击腐败，污染及食品供应丑闻。然而，什么是实现这些目标的最佳路径已经引
发分歧：习近平是否应该放松对社会的政治控制来配合经济改革。
根据习近平对苏联的历史及苏联1991年崩溃的解读，迹象表明，习近平更倾斜于加强共
产党的正统。换句话说，习近平不会是戈尔巴乔夫。他不是一名改革者。
“为什么苏联共产党崩溃了？”据报道，习近平在近期的一次私下会议上提出。“一个
重要的原因是他们的理想和信念动摇了。最后，戈尔巴乔夫宣布解散苏联共产党，一个
伟大的党走了”，习近平说。
具有讽刺意味的是，习近平的结论是，西方的“自由”价值只是对“有
中国特色的社会主义”道路的一个干扰，要实现“中国梦”，习近平建议他的党也要保
持对该国军事的严格控制。
是北京领导人在误读历史吗？
首先，习近平陈述的“事实”是值得讨论的。另一种对历史的解读是，苏联共产党的倒
台，不是因为它动摇过自己的信念，却刚好相反-因为它反对戈尔巴乔夫的改革。根据
前美国驻苏联大使杰克·马特洛克（Jack Matlock）的一次演讲，他说，“戈尔巴乔夫
明白，当他开始尝试对苏联的改革时，苏联共产党就开始反对它。因此，为了推动这个
国家，他不得不撤消苏共的权力。他把他们国家的利益置于了党的利益之上，这位苏共
第一书记这样做了。”
苏联的崩溃，根据马特洛克，不是来自克格勃的政变未遂及叶利钦拒绝与戈尔巴乔夫妥
协。
其次，习近平可能在得出错误的结论。可以肯定的是，没有类比是完美的，但是习近平
若想从历史中吸取教训，今天中国面临的困境，是更像苏联在1980年代所面临的，当时
苏联经济停滞，还是苏联的1960年代，经济仍旧在增长？
习近平的解读是，如果中国共产党要避免崩溃，应该把1980年代戈尔巴乔夫的改革视为
一个警世故事。这种观点认为，习近平应避免苏联的“错误”-放松共产主义原则，放
松独裁统治。
另一种解读是：问题是，苏联的问题不是因为它试图改革，而是因为它在还没有改革之
前就出现了经济停滞。
中国短期战略是要保持政治的稳定，这对于象习近平这样的个别领导人而言是可以理解
的。但是，领导层需要作出艰难的选择。着眼于短期的稳定，最终可能会弄巧成拙。正
如当谷歌决定退出中国时，我所提的。作为“世界上最活跃、最热衷于过滤网络信息”
的国家，难道中国能有革新吗？谷歌董事长埃里克·施密特（Eric Sc
hmidt）和贾里德·科恩（Jared Cohen）在他们即将出版的新书《新数字时代？》中写
道。
可以这样来看中国的困境：为了成为一个更具创新性、世界领先的经济体，中国就必须
开放政治。但这样做，可能会带来不稳定。作为一名领导人，象习近平，如果更感兴趣
的是自己的政治生存的话，那么他今天选择“稳定”超过未来（国家）的经济活力，是
可以理解的。
然而，中国的封闭体制将令其面临的一些最大的问题变得混乱-打击腐败，促进创新和
创业精神，确保劳工和环境的保护。今天你到中国，可能会听到无数对腐败的抱怨。习
近平已清醒地认识到了公众对腐败问题的恼怒。他说，政府将严厉打击贪官污吏，促进
党员更朴实的生活方式，其中许多（党员）是亿万富豪。但是，如果没有一个自由开放
的新闻和信息获取，这种努力可能是空谈，贪污会阻碍经济发展。
这同样适用于促进改善劳工及环境标准。目前尚不清楚，没有一个强大的、自由的公民
社会，一个国家是否能够真正解决这些重要的问题。此外，没有一个开放的社会和在其
教育系统中自由的思想交流，中国能够过渡成为一个创新的经济体吗？它的独裁统治，
最终可能会令其最优秀的人才和企业无法生存，抑制创新，并把国家导入“中等收入陷
阱”。最终，僵化的政治制度可能会失败，产生出能够迎接那些挑战的领导人。 |
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