h*h
发帖数: 27852 | 1 【 以下文字转载自 ChinaNews 讨论区 】
发信人: hsh (三胡), 信区: ChinaNews
标 题: 这是利比亚的新的革命？
发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Mon Feb 21 16:34:32 2011, 美东)
这是利比亚的新的革命？
由Dirk Vandewalle，特向美国有线新闻网
（CNN）的 - 任何持续的反对，在利比亚的开放思想博格尔斯异议，即使是卡扎菲上校
的严密控制的国家最老资格的观察家的想法。
自从他1969年来到了不流血政变，更换了亲西方桑西君主政权，利比亚领导人统治一个
铁腕的手，几乎没有留下任何机会，反对合并。
出乎我们通常所说的，在西方，卡扎菲的方式，能够巩固这一高度集权体制到位不仅依
靠感知纯洁，蛮力 - 虽然这始终是最终决定因素 - 但也另外两个因素。
一个是一个分而治之复杂的系统，平衡的家庭，部落和对对方国家的省份。二是通过伪
装自己在反西方，尤其是反美地幔，至少最初，在灾难性的，其中包括后殖民时期的残
暴和一个完全腐败感知为君主制，在财政和国家遗产思想上他的同胞许多共鸣。
保护卡扎菲的利比亚这样的组合 - 一个国家，在他的理论是由公民直接运行 - 针对不
稳定和证明直到上周无懈可击。
四十年来，经受住了与西方的制度，其中包括在1986年4月，是美国单方面的经济制裁
和多边外交和经济制裁，孤立了深刻的国家，一个与邻国乍得的一系列灾难性战争的美
国轰炸的黎波里和班加西公开对抗这使一种讽刺了对利比亚的军队。
任何一方都不可能是被俘。输赢确实是一个生死攸关的问题。
在巨大的经济和外交压力，利比亚同意在2003年12月结束其大规模杀伤性武器计划，承
诺支付在苏格兰洛克比上空爆炸事件的受害者1988年航空公司赔偿，并与西方的不稳定
的和平。
卡扎菲还成功地抵御了一些内部企图推翻这个政权，并成功地剔骨所有世俗和宗教反对
派团体。该制度似乎不可战胜的，不受任何障碍是其统治者的方式抛出。
然而在这里，我们是：在班加西和整个昔兰尼加利比亚东部地区群众性示威活动。利比
亚公民处于危险之中，在已成为在该地区最血腥的起义之一他们的生活，了解得很清楚
，如果他们失去了战斗，该制度的影响将是迅速和血腥。
坡对他们是利比亚的强大安全机构，革命委员会，一个陆军旅，而且，据称，外国雇佣
军。但对于这些制度的捍卫者，同样的逻辑认为：如果他们输了，他们将受到影响，可
能无法描述在谁是那些已经发生的暴行激怒了利比亚公民手中。
正是在这个充满活力的部分，其中任何一方都无法承受损失，助长了极端的暴力，我们
现在目睹利比亚：任何一方都不可能是被俘。输赢确实是一个生死攸关的问题。
利比亚什么加剧了危机，有效地没有国家中介机构，因为军队在邻国突尼斯和埃及，即
可以调解，帮助解决起义。利比亚的军队是不是一个真正的国家军队，也不是一个专业
公司之一。它是由同一个充斥分而治之，在利比亚的所有国家机构都遭受过的问题。
除了卡扎菲和密切的心腹圈子，只有一个巨大的政治和社会的真空。有没有利比亚社会
范围内组织也没有任何年轻的领导班子可以负起政治责任群体。也没有一个国家以任何
有意义的方式认同的感觉。这个在利比亚失范显然没有为未来的良好征兆，无论怎样变
成起义。
但是未来会怎样呢？利比亚依然存在，为那些在最近几天变得可见，严格控制和高度集
权的政治体制裂缝。无论是在班加西的示威者有足够的持久的能源站起来，由政权的捍
卫者滥用暴力浪潮似乎仍然不明确，但经验丰富的观察家们并不十分乐观。
如果是热门的能源分别是蔓延到该国西部的一部分，影响将是巨大的。在的黎波里的绿
色广场，开罗的塔利尔广场和象征相当于每年在卡扎菲举行了周年游行，示威前几天提
出的外观，将真实，无情地把这个新的利比亚革命回家。赔率看不太擅长做这点很好。
然而，在利比亚，突尼斯和埃及在以前，当小费来判断该政权的支持者说，对他们变成
潮流点。媒体和更广泛的社会媒体在利比亚的情况下，使人们更加难以辨别当这个临界
点已经达成，但在部落社会，消息传得快。
无论方向起义利比亚在未来几天里，随之而来的将是相当大的混乱，以及暴力和流血事
件没有相等的水平迄今在该地区可能。
+++Is this Libya's new revolution?
By Dirk Vandewalle, Special to CNN
(CNN) -- The thought of any sustained opposition and open dissent in Libya
boggles the mind of even the most seasoned observers of Col. Moammar Gadhafi
's tightly controlled country.
Since he came to power in a bloodless coup in 1969 that replaced the pro-
Western Sanusi monarchy, Libya's leader has ruled with an iron-fisted hand
that left almost no chance for any opposition to coalesce.
Quite contrary to what we normally perceive in the West, the way in which
Gadhafi was able to cement this highly authoritarian system into place
relied not only on pure, brute force -- although that has always remained
the ultimate deciding factor -- but also on two other factors.
One was an intricate system of divide-and-rule that balanced families,
tribes and the country's provinces against each other. The second was by
cloaking himself in an anti-Western and particularly anti-U.S. mantle that,
initially at least, resonated among many of his fellow citizens after
disastrous national legacies that included a brutal colonial period and a
monarchy that was perceived as utterly corrupt, both financially and
ideologically.
That combination protected Gadhafi's Jamahiriya -- a country that in his
theory is run directly by its citizens -- against destabilization and proved
unassailable until last week.
For four decades, the regime withstood open confrontations with the West
that included the U.S. bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986, a
series of unilateral U.S. economic sanctions and multilateral diplomatic and
economic sanctions that profoundly isolated the country and a disastrous
war with neighboring Chad that made a mockery out of the Libyan army.
Neither side can be taken prisoner. Winning or losing is truly a matter of
life or death.
Under great financial and diplomatic strains, Libya agreed in December 2003
to end its weapons of mass destruction program, committed to pay
compensation for the victims of the 1988 airline bombing over Lockerbie,
Scotland, and made its uneasy peace with the West.
Gadhafi also successfully weathered several internal attempts to overthrow
the regime and managed to eviscerate all secular and religious opposition
groups. The regime seemed invincible, impervious to whatever obstacles were
thrown in its ruler's way.
Yet here we are: mass demonstrations in Benghazi and throughout the eastern
Libyan region of Cyrenaica. Libyan citizens are risking their lives in what
has become one of the bloodiest uprisings in the region, understanding
perfectly well that if they lose the battle that the regime's repercussions
will be swift and bloody.
Pitched against them are Libya's powerful security apparatuses,
Revolutionary Committees, an army brigade, and, allegedly, foreign
mercenaries. But for these defenders of the regime, the same logic holds: If
they lose, they will suffer, perhaps beyond description, at the hands of
Libyan citizens who are enraged by the atrocities that have already taken
place.
It is in part this dynamic, in which neither side can afford to lose, that
fuels the extreme violence we are now witnessing in Libya: neither side can
be taken prisoner. Winning or losing is truly a matter of life or death.
What exacerbates the crisis in Libya is that effectively there are no
national intermediaries, as the army was in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt,
that can mediate and help resolve the uprising. Libya's army is neither a
truly national army nor a professional one. It is riddled by the same divide
-and-rule problems that all national institutions in Libya have suffered
from.
Beyond Gadhafi and a close circle of confidants, there is only an enormous
political and social vacuum. There are neither organized groups within
Libyan society nor any younger leadership that can assume political duties.
Nor is there a sense of national identity in any meaningful manner. This
anomie within Libya obviously does not augur well for its future, no matter
how the uprisings turn out.
But what will that future be? Libya remains, for all of the cracks that have
become visible in recent days, a tightly controlled and highly
authoritarian political system. Whether the demonstrators in Benghazi have
enough lasting energy to stand up to seemingly indiscriminate waves of
violence by the regime's defenders is still not clear, but seasoned
observers are not terribly optimistic.
If that popular energy were to spread into the western part of the country,
the implications could be enormous. A demonstration in Tripoli's Green
Square, the symbolic equivalent of Cairo's Tahrir Square and where Gadhafi
annually holds his anniversary parades and just days ago made an appearance,
would truly and inexorably bring this new Libyan revolution home. The odds
do look not very good at this point.
Yet, in Libya, as in Tunisia and Egypt previously, there come tipping points
when supporters of the regime judge that the tide has turned against them.
The absence of media and broader social media in Libya makes it more
difficult for people to discern when that tipping point has been reached,
but in a tribal society, news travels fast.
Whatever direction the uprisings in Libya take in the next few days, the
ensuing chaos will be considerable, and the level of violence and bloodshed
perhaps without equal so far in the region. |
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